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THE PUEBLO, EC-121 AND MAY AGUEZ INCIDENTS: 
SOME CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES 
ROBERT R. SIMMONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The military response of the United States to the Pueblo, EC-
121 and Mayaguez crisis reflected less the severity of each crisis 
than the military capability available at the time of each incident. 
In 1968 and 1969, North Korea staged spectacular acts of 
violence against U.S. military craft. On January 23, 1968, it seized 
the U.S.S. Pueblo, an electronic surveillance ship, then in 
international waters. The crew of eighty-three, which suffered one 
fatality during the capture, was released after eleven months. The 
ship itself was never returned. On April 15, 1969, North Korea 
shot down an unarmed U.S. Navy EC-121 electronic surveillance 
aircraft over international waters. The entire crew of thirty-one 
was killed. 
The U.S. military reactions to each of these provocations 
included demonstrations of military capabilities, but retaliatory 
military violence was not used in either of them. In both cases, 
firm words and naval task forces were dispatched rapidly to the 
scene, but armed retaliation was not undertaken. In contrast, 
Cambodia's seizure of the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez on May 
12, 1975 prompted a quick and violent military reaction. 
This paper examines some of the continuities and differences 
among these incidents in terms of causes, U.S. responses and the 
impact of the military responses on the outcomes. Available 
sources indicated that one factor dominated these differences -
the war in Indochina. Heavily engaged in Southeast Asia in 1968 
and 1969, U.S. armed forces imply were not prepared to risk a 
simultaneous war over either the Pueblo or the EC-121. Political 
and public enthusiasm for a possible additional struggle in Korea, 
moreover, was low. These constraints were not operable at the 
time of the Mayaguez crisis when both military forces and 
political support were available for a limited action. Indeed, 
political sentiment seemed to favor a violent response that might 
redress, in some measure, the recent U.S. defeats in Indochina. 
The curious thing is that, regardless of these differences, the 
U.S. military response in each of these three crises apparently had 
little impact on the immediate outcome, but was perhaps of 
greater significance for later incidents. The crew of the Pueblo 
was not returned any earlier in 1968 because of the U.S. show of 
force. The lack of a violent response to the seizure of the Pueblo 
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may, in turn, have contributed to North Korea's willingness to 
take risks (such as shooting down the EC-121) but it did not seem 
to affect the negotiations over the Pueblo itself. The EC-121 crisis 
was essentially over immediately, for the crew died during the 
plane's destruction. The only option then open to the United 
States - an option it did not exercise - was a military retaliation. 
The lack of a violent response this time did not seem to affect the 
North one way or another. The U.S. response to the seizure of the 
Mayaguez was violent, out of all proportion to the incident itself. 
The ship and its crew would have been returned without this 
demonstration of military might. As suggested below, however, 
one benefit emerged, perhaps unintended, from this use of 
violence. The U.S. action was viewed by decision-makers around 
the world as irrational - an advantage for a state dealing with 
erratic foes, such as North Korea, that otherwise wish to foment 
crises. An illustration of a later outcome of the 1975 Mayaguez 
crisis is the murder by North Korean soldiers of two U.S. soldiers 
at Panmunjon in August 1976 (the first Asian crisis after the 
Mayaguez episode). It seems possible that the demonstrative U.S. 
action following that incident achieved added credibility because 
of the violent U.S. response to the seizure of the Mayaguez. 
II. THE PUEBLO 
The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) waged a bitter war between 1950 and 1953. Since 
then, each side has feared and suspected the other. Premier Kim Il 
Sung, an intense nationalist, has stridently proclaimed his anti-
United States foreign policy goals and proudly built his authority 
on the slogan of "chuch'e": autonomy and self-reliance. Mter 
1953, North Korea continued to proclaim its intention to liberate 
South Korea from the grasp of U.S. imperialism. For its part, the 
United States maintained a defense treaty with the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) and this relationship appeared threatening to North 
Korea. 
This mutual apprehension increased during the Vietnam war 
because each saw that conflict as a reflection of the shared 
hostilities. In October 1966, Kim Il Sung delivered an uncomprom-
ising speech reaffirming his intention to reunify the peninsula. 
This speech ("Let Us Defend Independence") condemned both 
"modern revisionism" (the USSR) and "left opportunism" (China). 
Shortly thereafter, President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Seoul to 
declare his solidarity with South Korea. These reciprocal warn-
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ings were underscored by an increase in armed incidents in the 
Demilitarized Zone and by subversive activities directed against 
South Korea. In 1966, there had been 50 incidents; in 1967, 729; in 
1968, 761.1 In 1967, more than 1,500 U.S. reconnaissance flights 
flew near the borders of North Korea. A "senior advisor for 
national security" said that the number of these flights during the 
preceding two years had "just increased and increased."2 
The DPRK experienced a rapid increase in its defense budget 
as it dramatically increased the number of incursions into the 
South. Moreover, it had staged a purge which had the effect of 
promoting professional military men interested in armed conflict 
with the South. The typically fervent anti-United States, anti-
South Korea rhetoric became even harsher. Meanwhile, relations 
with the People's Republic of China (PRC) turned frigid, with Red 
Guard Posters in the spring of 1967 calling Kim Il Sung a "fat 
revisionist". There were even reports of "shooting incidents" on 
the China-North Korea border.3 Ties with the USSR were correct 
but apparently not warm. The North was embarking on a hard, 
independent course. By the end of 1967, with this background of 
military tension, it was evident that Korea had the potential to 
test the U.S. ability to react decisively in more than one military 
crisis at the same time. 
On November 17, 1967, Pyongyang radio announced that it 
had "taken measures" against a group of more than one hundred 
fishing vessels that entered North Korean territorial waters. It 
made a similar broadcast, charging another incursion, on 
December 8 and reported on December 22 that North Korea seized 
"armed espionage boats disguised as fishing boats" during 
another mass "infiltration" into its waters by a South Korean 
fishing fleet. On January 6, 1968, Pyongyang radio announced: 
The U.S. imperialist aggressor army, which has been 
incessantly committing provocative acts lately on the sea off 
of the eastern coast, from 0600 hours this morning again 
dispatched many armed boats, mingled with fishing boats, 
under the escort of armed warships into the coastal waters of 
our side. 
1. Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Brookings Institution, 
1975), p. 163. 
2. Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The Truth of the Pueblo 
Affair (Corward-McCann, 1970), p. 183. 
3. New York Times, November 23, 1970. 
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The broadcast concluded that the continuation of such "reckless 
aggression" would result in "100-fold" retaliation by North 
Korea.4 Seoul radio reported on the same day that the North had 
seized five of seventy ships in a fishing fleet during this incident. 
The Pueblo was preparing to sail from Japan for its mission 
on January 8. It was unlikely that this particular news would 
have halted the Pueblo's sailing, however, because only South 
Korean ships had previously been bothered. 
The attack on the Pueblo began at approximately 11:30 P.M. 
(EDT) on January 22. The Pueblo initially encountered one Soviet-
style SO-l subchaser which carried a nineteen-man crew and 
mounted a fifty-seven-millimeter canon. The subchaser was soon 
joined by another subchaser of the same type, four motor torpedo 
boats and two North Korean MIGs which patrolled the operating 
area. After it was seized, the Pueblo was escorted to Wonsan 
Harbor (North Korea) where it arrived at 6:30 A.M. (EDT) on 
January 23_.5 
An attack on the Pueblo had been unexpected for three 
reasons: 
1. The Pueblo's sister ship, the USS Banner, had sailed 
along the coast of China, the USSR and North Korea since 
1965 without being fired upon. The Banner had operated off 
the coast of Wonson in January 1967 for about thirty-six 
hours and on one other occasion in the same year for eleven 
hours in the same general area where the Pueblo was later 
captured. In fact, when the Pueblo was seized, the Banner 
was on its way to patrol off Siberia. Infrequently harassed, it 
had not had to fire a single shot during its missions. Based 
on this precedent, there was no adequate military backup. 
The U.S. Fifth Air Force was to be kept informed about the 
Pueblo and a number of its F-105s were on two-hour alert on 
Okinawa, approximately 850 miles from Wonsan, but no 
naval units were allocated to these missions. A further 
intangible, but salient factor that contributed to the lack of 
close and constant awareness of the Pueblo's potential 
danger was summarized at 1969 Congressional Hearings by 
Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, commander of the U.S. 
Naval Forces in Japan at the time of the crisis. "[H]ad there 
4. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (Janu· 
ary 8, 1968), FE/2663/ A3/6. 
5. Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story (Doubleday & Co., 1970), 
pp. 178-83. 
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been any reason to suspect an unlawful seizure after 150 
years or more of no such seizures, I would not have ordered 
an unescorted AGER (auxiliary general environmental 
research) on the mission."6 The Banner had received naval 
support on only two of its sixteen missions. The Pueblo 
traveled alone as well. 
2. It was also presumed that North Korea's foreign 
policies were under the strong influence of the USSR. The 
USSR operated its own intelligence ships and had not seized 
any U.S. intelligence vessels. U.S. Admiral Thomas H. 
Moorer reported that the USSR at this time employed forty 
unarmed intelligence collection ships. Some, he said, 
occasionally have violated our territorial waters, but 
none has been attacked or fired upon by our forces nor 
has any of their crew been seized or killed. In fact, when 
these ships had been notified that they were in U.S. 
territorial waters and, in accordance with international 
law, were requested to leave, they did so.7 
It was, therefore, considered unlikely that a Soviet ally would 
violate a tacit naval agreement with the United States. 
Consequently, the captain and crew of the Pueblo, as well as 
superior U.S. command authorities, were surprised when the 
ship was seized. 
3. Since Premier Kim's October 1966 speech, the North's 
accusations had increased in ferocity and in frequency. 
Hence, they had lost much of their impact. Radio Pyongyang 
elaborated on the charges on January 8. "This once again 
proves that the U.S. imperialist aggressors are further 
aggravating tension in Korea and running wild to provoke a 
new war ... thus causing a grave situation in which a war 
may break out at any moment."8 The North Korean signals 
of willingness for action had been misread by Washington. 
Rear Admiral John Victor Smith, the senior negotiator for 
the UN command in Panmunjon, for example, had labeled 
these warlike messages "the usual communist garbage". 
Rear Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, then Chief of Naval 
6. Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, House of 
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services (GPO, 1969), p. 735. 
7. Ibid., pp. 635-36. 
8. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (Janu-
ary 9, 1968), FE/2664/ A3/16. 
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Operations, later explained Admiral Smith's remark on the 
grounds that "similar warnings had been issued on prior 
occasions and there was nothing to indicate that the North 
Koreans were referring to anything other than fishing 
vessels."9 This evaluation, however, ignored the seizure of 
South Korean fishing boats in increasing numbers, the rapid 
increase of incursions into the South and the raid by a team 
of North Korean commandos on the South Korean presiden-
tial mansion just before the seizure of the Pueblo. 
A. The U.S. Military Response 
The United States, almost totally preoccupied with the 
burdens of Vietnam, was not prepared to cope quickly with a 
second conflict. At the time of the seizure of the Pueblo, the 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise and the frigate 
Truxton were 510 miles southwest of the port ofWonsan where the 
Pueblo was taken. Although there were fifty-nine fighter aircraft 
aboard the Enterprise, only thirty-five were operational. Four F-
4B Phantoms with a speed of Mach 2 and a range of more than 
1,500 miles were on five-minute "alert". The alert F-4Bs, however, 
were intended to defend the carriers from air attack and so were 
equipped with air-to-air "Sparrow" and "Sidewinder" missiles. It 
was estimated that it would have taken approximately three hours 
to refit these aircraft with air-to-surface missiles and send them 
off to the Pueblo; by that time dusk would have fallen. 10 
Two A-4 and F-4 Marine squadrons based in Japan were then 
receiving air-to-surface attack training with non-nuclear weap-
onry. It is conceivable that they could have reached the Pueblo 
during the two hours before it arrived at Wonsan, but these 
squadrons were not informed about the Pueblo until the next 
morning.11 At the time of the Pueblo's capture, there had not been 
a "strip alert" by U.S. Air Force fighters which would have 
provided the capability of a quick nonnuclear armed response. 
Similarly, they were unprepared to fight off the 450 Mig defenders. 
By contrast, in mid-January 1968, readily available (but nuclear-
armed) U.S. land-based military aircraft in the immediate region 
were seven fighter-bombers in Korea, eighteen on Okinawa and 
sixteen in Japan. 
9. Ibid., p. 638. 
10. Ibid., p. 896. 
11. Ibid., p. 900. 
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Brigadier General John W. Harrell, commander of the U.S. 
Air Force in the Republic of Korea, stated a few days after the 
seizure that he had received "no instructions to prevent its capture 
or come to its rescue,"12 apparently because the forces under his 
command were not conventionally armed. 
Because the U.S. planes on alert in South Korea itself were 
equipped with nuclear weapons, aircraft were requested from 
Okinawa. By the time these aircraft reached South Korea, 
darkness was about to fall, so the aircraft were not dispatched to 
the scene. South Korean aircraft, under UN and not U.S. 
command, were not asked to assist. Moreover, South Korean 
planes were not equipped with delivery capabilities adequate to 
the rapid response the situation called for. Furthermore, Washing-
ton was probably reluctant to risk Seoul becoming as adventure-
some as Pyongyang if encouraged to liberate the Pueblo. 
Even if aircraft armed with conventional air-to-surface 
weapons had been available for use over the Pueblo before dusk, a 
question would be, what would be gained by the use of military 
power? A New York Times editorial of January 24, 1968 
appreciated the risks of a military reaction when it warned, 
"Whatever the facts may prove to be, the incident does present, as 
the White House has observed, 'a very serious situation.' Such a 
situation must not be dealt with in passion, for it could lead to a 
sharp and dangerous new escalation of the Asian war." President 
Johnson himself recalled, "We know that if we wanted our men to 
return home alive we had to use diplomacy. If we resorted to 
military means, we could expect dead bodies. And we almost 
might start a war.'' Similarly, the P~cific Command believed that 
"use of our aircraft, instead of saving our men, would endanger 
their lives, and they conclude that the pilots of the aircraft would 
be taking an unacceptable risk, in view of the large number of 
North Korean jet fighters massed in the area around Wonsan, 
North Korea."l3 
The President's stress on diplomacy reflected an acknowledg-
ment of the pressures already bearing on U.S. military response 
capabilities. The difficulty of mounting a swift response, the 
shortage of appropriate military force and uncertainty about a 
North Korean reaction to a U.S. military strike were joined to 
another factor: Was the seizure of the Pueblo signaling an 
imminent invasion of the South? 
12. Washington Post, January 29, 1968. 
13. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (Popular Library, 1970), p. 536. 
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Almost immediately, Washington ordered the dispatch of a 
large task force (77) to approach Wonsan. These ships were to 
include three cruisers (Providence, Canberra and Chicago), five 
carriers (Enterprise, Ranger, Yorktown, Kearsage and Coral Sea) 
and eighteen destroyers. As this task force moved into the Sea of 
Japan, the USSR positioned a squadron of about a dozen vessels 
close to the U.S. ships; specifically, Kotlin and Kashin class 
destroyers, tankers and the trowler Gidrolog, equipped with 
Pueblo-type electronic devices to intercept communications and 
radar.14 
-- - -
Because of this Soviet naval presence, the involvement of the 
USSR in the Pueblo crisis remained for the moment unclear. 
Although the purpose of the Soviet ships was uncertain to 
Washington, the United States noted with dismay that its 
requests to the USSR (transmitted by U.S. Ambassador Lewellyn 
Thompson) to intercede with North Korea were quickly turned 
aside. 
In the first half day after the seizure, Washington was aware 
of two developments. Conventionally armed planes could not 
reach the Pueblo before dark and U.S. naval vessels were 
proceeding toward Korea. But the question of whether North 
Korea had acted without Soviet encouragement remained for the 
moment unanswered. Another factor under consideration was 
potential intensification of the fighting in Vietnam which would 
place additional heavy demands upon the U.S. military. 
In this context, President Johnson and the National Security 
Council had evaluated the options for military retaliation. After 
much discussion, the possibilities were reduced to: (1) an attempt 
to storm Wonsan Harbor and retrieve the ship by force; (2) seizure 
or destruction of one or more North Korean ships in retaliation or 
for potential bargaining power; (3) aerial bombing and sinking of 
the Pueblo at the Wonsan docks to deny to the Communists access 
to the intelligence gathering equipment on board; and (4) a naval 
blockade of Wonsan and perhaps other North Korean ports.15 
Faced with the continual drain caused by Vietnam and a 
growing loss of support in the public and in Congress, the 
President was not willing to run the risk of increasing incidents 
and violence with North Korea (and perhaps, by extension, of 
gambling with the developing detente with the USSR). Nonethe-
14. New York Times, January 25, February 8, 1968. 
15. Ibid., January 25, 1968. 
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less, Johnson decided to transmit a signal of warning to North 
Korea. 
He wanted to do something pretty quick, another former 
White House aide says, but he was in the position of not 
knowing, not finding anything that looked like a very good 
thing to do. He talked to McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, Clifford. 
He telephoned Sam Berger, (Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs), in the middle of the night. 
His message: Give us more ideas, more alternatives; think 
them out.16 
The essence of these consultations, along with individual 
comments by important U.S. leaders, was widely publicized by 
means of official or "leaked" observations, a mechanism that 
allowed both the domestic audience and the targets (Pyongyang 
and its anticipated instructor, Moscow) to appreciate the range of 
choices available. The main thrust of those signals was that 
Washington would prefer a negotiated settlement to the incident 
but did not totally rule out the use of force. 
Viewing this crisis as a square in a larger chess board, 
President Johnson dramatically signaled U.S. determination to 
rely on a mixture of force and diplomacy for the Pueblo situation. 
He ruled out military power to retrieve the Pueblo because it ran a 
high risk of unacceptable consequences. His reluctance to use the 
military was reinforced by the expectation that heavy demands 
would shortly be placed on the U.S. military in Vietnam. A 
specific indication that Task Force 77 was not to be used with an 
operation connected with freeing the Pueblo was sent by General 
Earle Wheeler on January 24: 
10:25 A.M.: It is desired that no show of force be deployed in 
area of Pueblo incident. Hold all forces south of 36-00N until 
further advised ... 12:25 P.M.: JCS had directed ... proceed 
no further north than present positions. Higbee remain in 
company of Enterprise and Truxton. Do not, repeat, do not, 
send Higbee to take position off Wonsan.17 
General Wheeler's direction that "no show of force be 
deployed in area of Pueblo incident" was perhaps the most concise 
description of the objective assigned to Task Force 77 - to 
16. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 259-61. 
17. Ibid., p. 239. Armbrister previously recounts that the destroyer Higbee was 
to have been assigned to enter Wonsan Harbor and retrieve the Pueblo crew. 
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demonstrate military capabilities, but not to use violence. The last 
part of this message referred to the first of the four military 
options which had envisioned storming Wonsan harbor to bring 
out the Pueblo. Within half a day of the ship's capture, this option 
and the other military options that risked a possible second front 
had been ruled out because of stretched military capabilities and 
the anticipation of an enemy offensive in Vietnam. Once the crew 
of the Pueblo had arrived in North Korea, moreover, it was not 
known either where they were or precisely how North Korea would 
respond. As Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach noted, 
"The crew is expendable, but you don't want to expend the lives of 
82 men and still not accomplish anything. That would be a 
disaster."1a In short, the administration publicly underlined a 
prudent approach to the Pueblo crisis, combined with a demon-
stration of military strength. 
This approach was highlighted when the President mobilized 
14,787 Air Force and Navy reservists on January 25. This was 
done without prior consultation with the Congress whose leaders, 
agreeing that a rapid, firm stance must be taken, expressed 
surprise but no open irritation. 
The military mobilization, however, did not affect the 
resolution of the Pueblo crisis. The troops mobilized were neither 
ordered overseas immediately nor even moved to bases for 
eventual deployment. Rear Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis would 
assert, "Our units were recalled without deployable equipment. 
They were not in a position to be immediately responsive."19 In 
other words, these recently recalled reservists could not have gone 
to war. The mobilization was intended chiefly as a demonstrative 
military action. In part, the mobilization signaled the U.S. 
determination to both allies and adversaries (there were shudders 
of apprehension that the Pueblo incident might trigger a new war; 
in Paris the volume of gold trading quickly nearly doubled). The 
mobilization also signaled to the American audience the adminis-
trations's concern about developments in Asia and its willingness 
to take serious measures to rectify the situation. There was also 
some suspicion that the Pueblo crisis simply provided an excuse 
for the first military mobilization during the Vietnam war, just 
before an anticipated enemy offensive in Vietnam. In short, the 
prime military concern remained Southeast Asia. 
18. Ibid., p. 259. 
19. Ibid., p. 263. 
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B. Domestic Restraints 
The declarations from Washington emphasized restraint but 
did not preclude the possibility of violence. Clark M. Clifford, the 
President's nominee for Secretary of Defense, summarized the 
administration's position in a widely reported testimony before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee. He testified that "[t]he 
President would like very much to get these 83 Americans out of 
the hands of the North Koreans and get them back. And I believe 
that he will make every effort along the diplomatic front to 
achieve that purpose."20 On January 26, after the option of a 
retaliatory strike had been rejected, President Johnson spoke on 
national television: 
We shall continue to use every means available to find a 
proper and peaceful solution. . . . We have taken and are 
continuing taking certain precautionary measures to make 
sure that our military forces are prepared for any contin-
gency. . . . I hope that North Korea will recognize the 
gravity of the situation they have created. . . . I am 
confident that the American people will exhibit in this crisis, 
as they have in other crises, determination and sanity.21 
On the same day, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg spoke before 
the United Nations Security Council. "It is imperative that the 
Security Council act with the greatest urgency. This course is far 
more preferable to the remedies which the Charter reserves to 
member states."22 This was a reference to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter which permits self-defense for unilateral military actions. 
It was a calm warning that the United States had not entirely 
ruled out the option of violence. This verbal caution, however, was 
given after the administration had rejected the use of force to free 
the Pueblo. The demonstration of the availability of a military 
option at this time apparently was intended to encourage Moscow 
to serve as a mediator in the crisis. The State Department had 
announced on January 23 that an "urgent request" for the release 
of the Pueblo had been sent to North Korea through the USSR. 
Opinion in the United States was divided, but the balance 
seemed to favor the doves over the hawks. Senator Richard B. 
Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
20. New York Times, January 26, 1968. 
21. New York Times, January 27, 1968. 
22. Ibid. 
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assessed the Pueblo capture as "amounting to an act of war." 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk agreed, saying that the seizure was 
"in the category of actions to be considered as an act of war." The 
House Republican minority leader, Gerald R. Ford, declared that if 
diplomacy fails, "the United States must take whatever military 
action is necessary" to recover the vessel and crew. 23 
More moderate voices were heard as well. Senator Mike 
Mansfield cautioned, "We should keep our shirts on . . . . We 
should not let our emotions take over. . . . We should not take 
military action now .... The government should make the 
necessary protests and objections through China and the Soviet 
Union."24 Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, urged, "We should be very careful 
in this instance not to jump to conclusions until we know all the 
facts." 25 "All the facts" apparently referred to the U.S. military 
experience in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident. Fulbright also 
continued to hope that the USSR would persuade North Korea to 
return the Pueblo. The Pueblo had been seized while the Foreign 
Relations Committee was trying to decide whether to conduct a 
formal hearing on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Senator Fulbright 
declared that the government had "deceived" the public about 
ships in the 1964 incident, in that they were engaged in electronic 
intelligence work, as, admittedly, was the Pueblo. Another 
member of this committee, Senator Wayne Morse, pursued the 
comparison between 1964 and 1968. "The Maddox was a spy ship 
under instruction to stimulate the electronic instruments of North 
Vietnam, they were carrying out a spying activity."26 
This cloud of gathering suspicion about the 1964 incident 
inhibited an unambiguously forceful response in 1968. Moreover, 
in 1968, North Korea had seized a functioning electronic 
intelligence ship while a draining war continued in nearby 
Indochina. The willingness of the American people, therefore (as 
expressed by their elected representatives), to support a military 
reaction was diluted because of gathering doubts about the causes 
of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The question was whether the 
capture of the Pueblo would duplicate the Gulf of Tonkin incident 
which had led to the intense involvement in Vietnam. 
23. New York Times, January 24, January 25, 1968; Washington Post, 
January 25, 1968. 
24. New York Times, January 25, 1968. 
25. Ibid. 
26. New York Times, February 22, 1968. 
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The American public was willing to use force to regain the 
Pueblo's crew but opposed to a prolonged conflict on a second 
front in Asia. The first Gallup Poll after the seizure of the Pueblo 
(February 1, 1968) showed that forty percent of those responding 
to the poll favored using force to regain the Pueblo; only three 
percent felt that the United States should declare war against 
North Korea. The Harris Poll in the first week of February 1968 
summarized its fmdings on the public attitude toward the crisis: 
"It is clear that the American people are prepared to back military 
action in Korea, but they do not feel the Pueblo incident justifies 
another war."27 
C. Negotiations 
At first, Moscow refused to help gain the release of the Pueblo 
or its crew. President Johnson had been surprised by Moscow's 
brusque rejection of the request, particularly since the USSR had 
itself frequently deployed such ships on similar missions. 
For years both the United States and the Soviet Union had 
been employing intelligence-gathering ships, as well as 
planes, and the ships occasionally wandered off course. In 
1965 there were two separate incidents of Soviet vessels 
entering U.S. waters. We did not make a big issue of the 
infringements. We merely ordered them to leave.28 
Despite the initial rebuff, Washington continued to request 
Moscow's assistance. Meanwhile, several factors worked together 
to create a climate for more favorable response: the decision not to 
retaliate, the demonstrations of U.S. military preparedness and 
appeals to the USSR as a partner in the use of unarmed naval 
intelligence collectors. At the same time, Washington realized that 
Moscow did not completely control Pyongyang's decisions and 
was displeased with the North Korean action. 
At the same time, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had been 
visiting India for talks with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. 
On January 26, an Indian spokesman reporting on the talks 
stated, "Mr. Kosygin described the Pueblo incident as a routine 
matter of one country's ship straying in the territorial waters of 
27. Cited in New York Times, February 11, 1968. 
28. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 534. The captains of these two ships 
appeared in an Alaskan court and pleaded "no contest" to the charge of violating 
U. S. territorial waters. In these unrelated trials, one ship paid a fine of $5,000, the 
other, a fine of $10,000. 
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another country and said that it should be treated as such .. 
The Soviet position is to defuse the matter and not to attach great 
importance to it."29 Reporters attached to Premier Kosygin's 
delegation wrote, "Russian officials in Premier Kosygin's entour-
age indicated today that the Soviet Union is interested in freeing 
the U.S.S. Pueblo despite the negative signals Moscow has been 
transmitting . . . there is a gap between Soviet actions and 
Moscow's first response to American requests for help."30 
- - -- -- -
On January 28, 1968, The Washington Post, again in a 
dispatch from New Delhi, reported that "well-placed Russian 
sources" suggested that the ship could be traded for confessions 
from the crew and an exchange of prisoners between North and 
South Korea. If these were accurate sentiments voiced by Soviet 
officials in an effort to mediate, they would have been beneficial. 
It should be noted, however, that the USSR quickly denied the 
validity of these stories. The Soviet position was repeated publicly 
in Pravda's authoritative "Observer" column on February 4: 
It is clear that attempts to achieve something from a 
sovereign Socialist state, the Korean People's Democratic 
Republic, can have no chance of success if accompanied by 
threat and pressure. Now it is especially important that the 
United States take no rash steps that would further 
complicate the situation. 
Interestingly, three days after the ship's capture, the North 
Korean negotiator at the Mixed Armistice Commission at 
Panmunjom stated, "All you have to do is to admit military 
provocations and aggressive acts committed by your side, 
apologize for them and assure (this Conference) table that you will 
not re-commit such criminal acts."31 While this speech was vague 
and did not promise release of the crew, it did suggest some 
flexibility. This less than rigid posture was again implied when 
Jun Im Chol, Vice President of the Korean Red Cross, predicated 
that the Pueblo would not be returned "under any circumstan-
ces."32 Again, no mention of the crew was made; reference had 
been made to the ship but not the crew. 
29. Washington Post, January 27, 1968. 
30. Ibid. 
31. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (Janu-
ary 31, 1968), FE/2685/ A317. 
32. Washington Post, February 1, 1968. This statement was made in Colombo, 
Ceylon. 
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Among other things, this delicate Soviet stance indicated to 
Washington that part of the reason for the seizure of the Pueblo 
had been Korea's wish to demonstrate an activist stance distinct 
from those of the USSR and China. Commander Bucher's 
"confession," for example, issued shortly after the ship's capture, 
acknowledged that U.S. intelligence vessels had also sailed off of 
the coasts of China and the USSR. This statement allowed North 
Korea to portray itself as being in the vanguard of the anti-
imperialist struggle. Recognizing intrabloc disagreement on 
tactics, Washington avoided harsh verbal attacks on the USSR 
and continued to seek its assistance as a mediator for the crew's 
release. President Johnson commented that, after a few days, "in 
spite of their initial rebuff of Ambassador Thompson's request, 
the Russians were now urging us to act with restraint and we 
believe that they could be helpful."33 
Interestingly, there had been an analogous situation less than 
half a decade before the seizure of the Pueblo. A U.S. military 
helicopter with two pilots had been downed just north of the 38th 
Parallel on the Korean peninsula on May 17, 1963. In March 1964, 
the United States apologized, claiming that the violation had been 
caused by navigational error, but Washington refused to admit 
spying. On May 16, 1964, the pilots were released when the United 
States signed a statement prepared by North Korea acknowledg-
ing espionage. It declared that the helicopter had been "captured 
by the self-defense measures of the People's Army while commit-
ting military espionage acts after deliberately intruding."34 
Immediately after the pilots were freed, the United States 
denounced the signed document as "meaningless". 
The helicopter case provided a model of an incident in which 
retaliatory force was withheld over a time span about the same as 
the detention of the Pueblo. As in the Pueblo episode five years 
later, North Korea had demanded an admission of spying by the 
United States. In each case, after almost a year's refusal, 
Washington signed a paper of acknowledgment which it imme-
diately declared to be false. Therefore, during the 1968 negotia-
tions over the release of the Pueblo, both Pyongyang and 
Washington had a precedent to pursue, one that was haltingly but 
closely followed. It is interesting that the experience of the 
33. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 536. 
34. New York Times, May 17, 1964. 
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helicopter's capture and release was recalled almost immediately 
after the Pueblo's seizure.35 
In a public speech a week after the seizure, the Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party rejected a 
military solution for the release of the Pueblo crew, but referred to 
"the method of previous practice." Washington responded quickly. 
Thereupon, Pyongyang agreed to hold private talks. A statement 
was drafted by Ambassador Berger, Undersecretary Katzenbach 
and Secretary of State Rusk. 36 These sequestered discussions were 
more restrained than the vitriolic, open diatribes that usually 
characterized U.S.-Korean negotiations. The private meetings 
began on February 2 at Panmunjom. North Korea insisted that 
the United States had committed the "criminal act of espionage" 
and demanded that the United States admit the correctness of this 
charge, apologize for the intrusion and promise not to repeat this 
criminal action. This acknowledgment, roughly parallel to both 
the 1964 concessions and the demands of North Korea throughout 
1968, was largely the agreement that did accompany the freeing of 
the crew eleven months later. 
North Korea's implied call for talks based on the 1963-64 
pattern came one day after the beginning of the Tet Offensive. A 
"second front" seemed even less desirable to both sides - the 
United States because of the intensified involvement in Southeast 
Asia and North Korea because of its fear of a U.S. military strike. 
More than a year after the release of the Pueblo crew, the senior 
North Korean delegate at Panmunjom commented on North 
Korea's fear of an attack shortly after the Pueblo's seizure. "We 
came near to it ... for a period of two or three months, the entire 
people of the southern part (of North Korea) lived in a state of 
constant alert .... "37 
In February, it appeared that fruitful negotiations were 
developing. Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford regretted that: 
The Johnson Administration apparently is getting ready to 
"confess" to North Korea. This comes as a shock to members 
of Congress who have relied upon earlier statements by the 
Administration and by our Ambassador to the UN, Arthur T. 
35. Washington Post, January 24, 1968. 
36. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 274. 
37. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea (University 
of California Press, 1973), p. 985. 
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Goldberg, flatly asserting that the Pueblo had not intruded 
upon the territorial water of North Korea. 38 
To some degree, this limited progress was aided by military 
actions. On February 2, 1968, Hungary had advised the United 
States that if it wanted the Pueblo negotiations to succeed, it must 
move the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise farther out to 
sea. The value of stationing the Enterprise off the Korean coast 
lay ultimately less in its ability to carry out shelling and bombing 
of North Korea and more in the opportunity to withdraw it in a 
negotiating exchange. Mter the private talks began between 
North Korea and the United States, the United States agreed to 
withdraw the huge aircraft carrier as a symbol of its earnest 
desire for the success of the talks. In this situation, the "show of 
force" operated two ways. It is probable that North Korea 
understood the symbolism of both em placing, and then withdraw-
ing, units of the armed forces as evidence of U.S. willingness to 
make concessions. The ship moved on February 7, but the 
Pentagon specifically said the carrier was not moved back to a 
station off Vietnam. For North Korea, fearful of a possible U.S.-
ROK military strike, the request for the removal of the Enterprise 
was logical. Even after the Enterprise pulled back, the remaining 
U.S. naval presence was still impressive. It included the Yorktown 
(CV A), Ranger (CV A) and the cruisers Canberra and Chicago. 
Moreover, the Enterprise had not actually been near North Korea 
but had cruised between Japan and South Korea. By February 20, 
the Enterprise was in Subic Bay, the Philippines. 
In the first week of February 1968, as North Korean and U.S. 
representatives met at Panmunjom, Seoul worried about an 
agreement being reached without its knowledge or consultation 
because it had been excluded from the talks. On February 11, 
1968, the major Seoul newspaper, Dong-A Ilbo, stated: 
The United States must realize that connivance with the 
Communists over the recent intrusion of a North Korean 
commando unit into Seoul in exchange for the release of the 
U.S. prestige as well as the loss of confidence by Koreans in 
the U.S. 
The South Korean National Assembly then adopted a strong 
resolution condemning private negotiations between the United 
States and North Korea. South Korean Premier Chung Il Kwon 
met with U.S. Ambassador William J. Porter and General Charles 
38. New York Times, February 6, 1968. 
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Bonesteel, commander of U.S. forces. Premier Chung's demands 
were that the problem of infiltration from North Korea take 
precedence over the Pueblo, that South Korea be included in all 
negotiations and that there be an increase in U.S. aid to Seoul. At 
this time, South Korea announced a military mobilization of its 
own. In addition to its potential defensive function, the mobiliza-
tion served as a signal to Washington. Beginning in 1965, South 
Korea had sent more than 47,000 troops to Vietnam to support the 
U.S. position. South Korean on-line capabilities were therefore 
limited. Would the United States fulfill its treaty obligations to its 
loyal ally? Or should South Korea withdraw its troops from 
Vietnam to prepare its own defense? 
On February 11, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R. 
Vance, President Johnson's special envoy, arrived in Seoul to 
explain the U.S. position on the Pueblo negotiations. The 
communique issued at the end of the talks said that North Korean 
actions "seriously jeopardize the security of this area and if 
persisted in, can lead to renewed hostilities in Korea." If such 
aggressions were to continue, "the two countries would promptly 
determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Security 
Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States." 
This diluted the earlier South Korean request for an automatic 
military response to any North Korean infiltration. On the other 
hand, Vance agreed that U.S. military assistance to South Korea 
should increase markedly while private negotiations and priority 
to the Pueblo continued.39 
The North Koreans had put up an intriguing photo display in 
Panmunjom in the first half of February. Alongside pictures of the 
Pueblo crew were photographs of the two U.S. helicoper pilots who 
had been shot down in 1963 with their letter of apology and the 
acknowledgment from the U.S. government that they had been 
"spying".40 This could be seen as a hint of the solution to the 
negotiations, the one that was eventually adopted. 
On February 19, Washington publicly acknowledged that two 
U.S. planes had violated China's airspace. This unusual state-
ment could be interpreted as a further indication of willingness to 
bargain. At the end of February, the United States suggested 
submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice at the 
Hague. North Korea rejected this proposal in early March because 
the United States would not first admit "espionage". 
39. New York Times, March 20, 1969. 
40. Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 1968. 
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On May 8, at Washington's request, Pyongyang presented a 
long written list of accusations concerning both the Pueblo and 
U.S. foreign policies. U.S. leaders were divided about its accep-
tance. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs Paul Warnke felt that it "was so outrageous that you could 
sign it. I felt that we were taking a worse beating by keeping those 
men over there than we would by signing something right away, 
undergoing some momentary pain and getting them back." 
Others, such as Undersecretary of State Katzenbach, agreed that 
the North Korean statement could and should be signed.41 
North Korea had said, however, that agreement to its 
document would not be sufficient to secure release of the crew. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs Walt Rostow therefore advised against 
signing the document. Moreover, South Korea implicitly exercised 
an inhibiting influence through its obvious bitterness at the 
prospect of a "deal" between Washington and Pyongyang. 
On May 28, the U.S. negotiator and Panmunjom offered a 
partial repeat of the device that had resolved the 1964 crisis -
signing a "receipt" (a technique called an "overwrite") once the 
men were produced. North Korea rejected this because the United 
States would not admit that the Pueblo had been on an espionage 
mission. About six months later, as noted above, North Korea 
accepted a compromise. The United States would sign the North 
Korean document acknowledging spying and simultaneously 
issue a statement denying the same charges. 
Each participant wished to end the negotiations successfully. 
Pyongyang wanted this result because it realized that it might not 
be able to depend on Soviet military support. Furthermore, as the 
United States explicitly reminded it, if the talks were not 
successfully concluded by the end of December, North Korea 
would then have to negotiate with a new and perhaps tougher 
opponent - President Richard M. Nixon. 
At the Panmunjom meeting on December 17, the United States 
presented two alternate positions; an "overwrite" and a "prior 
repudiation" scheme. In both, the United States would have 
signed the document. One would include the denial in the 
document and the other would involve refuting the paper after 
release of the crew. The U.S. negotiator threatened that the United 
States would be forced to withdraw from the negotiations if North 
Korea did not agree to one of these proposals. "There would be no 
41. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 298. 
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further meetings. The North Koreans would have to deal with the 
Nixon Administration."4 2 
Mr. Nixon himself had signaled a rigid image, and this point 
of view had been beamed to Korea in the Korean language. Part of 
his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in May 1968, 
for example, read, "When respect for the United States of America 
falls so low that a fourth rate military power like North Korea will 
seize an American naval vessel in the high seas, it is time for new 
leadership to restore respect for the United States of America."43 
Later in the presidential campaign, Nixon said of the Pueblo, 
"What we should have done was to bring in the power to defend 
that ship or get it out of those waters." 
The crew of the Pueblo was released on December 23. 
D. Evaluation 
The deployment of a task force in the Sea of Japan did not 
persuade North Korea to release the Pueblo's crew at an early 
date. Indeed, the reverse may have been the case. The deployment 
of the force without an actual strike at North Korean targets 
proved that the strongest power in the world could be successfully 
challenged. North Korea viewed the fact that it had seized the 
Pueblo and suffered no retaliation as a victory. Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk had declared that the abduction was "an act ofwar".44 
President Johnson had quickly sent a sizeable naval force toward 
the crisis area. But U.S. bombs were not dropped, neither landing 
nor invading forces were dispatched, and the naval forces did not 
closely approach the coastal waters of North Korea. The United 
States' "bluff' had been called. The threat of using military force 
was conveyed by harsh verbal demand and the movement of 
military forces. But as it became evident that violence was not to 
be used, North Korea- which at first had expected an attack-
became more confident during the negotiations. These negotia-
tions began and ended with the same North Korean demands, 
demands that were eventually met. This lesson, moreover, that the 
U.S. show of force was only demonstrative, was most probably an 
important factor in North Korean planning for its next confronta-
42. Ibid., p. 335. According to Armbrister, this emphatic position was 
suggested by Nicholas Katzenbach, and sent to the U. S. negotiating team at 
Panmunjom and then presented to the Koreans. 
43. New York Times, August 8, 1968. 
44. New York Times, January 25, 1968. 
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tion with the United States. This same example was undoubtedly 
appreciated by the Communist military in Southeast Asia. 
This is not to say that a more satisfactory outcome from the 
U.S. perspective would have resulted from the use of violence 
against North Korea. The probable results of a retaliatory strike 
were grim: death of the crew, continued conflict of an indetermi-
nate nature between the United States and North Korea and 
increased hostilities by the North against South Korea. 
On the positive side, the incident did strengthen communica-
tions and tacit understanding between Moscow and Washington. 
Moscow was reassured when the United States did not lash out 
militarily at North Korea, even as Washington demonstrated that 
it had the capibility to do so. At the same time, as a consequence 
of the Pueblo episode, both superpowers came to understand the 
USSR was not responsible for the military adventures of North 
Korea. Pyongyang learned that it could not depend on either 
China or the USSR for automatic military assistance. 
III. THE EC-121 
President Johnson's initial reaction to the Pueblo's capture 
had been to search for a response in proportion to the provocation. 
Similarly, when North Korea shot down an unarmed U.S. Navy 
reconnaissance plane with thirty-one men and six tons of 
electronic equipment on board about ninety miles off the North 
Korean coastline on April 15, 1969, President Nixon's first 
inclination was a "quick, clean" military retaliation. There had 
been 190 similar missions in the same area in the three months 
before this crisis. All of these flights took place without threats 
from North Korea. 45 Consequently, the destruction of the EC-121 
was unexpected and sudden. According to those who were with 
him at the time, the President "fumed when his military advisors 
failed to come up with what he considered practical ways to 
retaliate."46 An unnamed administration official commented at 
the time, "Had sufficient force been available to stage the raids 
after the President tentatively made up his mind to respond, I 
believe the attacks would have been ordered."47 
In sum, the "lessons" of the Pueblo had not been imple-
mented. There had not been an escort for the EC-121 intelligence 
45. Transcript of President Nixon's Press Conference of April 18, 1969, New 
York Times, April 19, 1969. 
46. Ibid., May 6, 1969. 
47. Ibid. 
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plane (again, because similar U.S. missions in the same area had 
not been fired upon), and there had not been enough convention-
ally armed aircraft on "strip-alert" to come to the EC-121's 
assistance even if there had been adequate warning. 
The puzzling problem for Washington was: If other planes 
had not been fired upon, why was this plane shot down without 
warning? The event occurred on Premier Kim Il Sung's fifty-
seventh birthday, perhaps not a coincidence, but certainly not the 
sole cause. Another reason for this incident may have been the 
airlifting of 1,200 United States combat troops from North 
Carolina to South Korea in mid-March. The operation, called 
"Focus Retina," transported this force to participate with South 
Korean soldiers against a "surprise attack from a third country". 
Everyone undoubtedly understood that the "third country" was 
North Korea. 
North Korea was likely to have understood the swift transfer 
of U.S. troops to South Korea as a threat. In the week preceding 
the arrival of the 1,200 U.S. soldiers, there were three armed 
clashes, initiated by the North, in the demilitarized zone. 
Interestingly, the North Korean media did not mention "Focus 
Retina" until after the shooting down of the EC-121. But then, a 
month after the operation, it referred to the U.S. airlift as "very 
provocative".48 It is conceivable that the attack on the EC-121 in 
April was the North Korean response to the U.S. operation in mid-
March. Pyongyang may well have thought that the risk of a 
violent U.S. military response, given U.S. behavior following the 
Pueblo, was not very great. 
President Johnson did not have a familiar precedent upon 
which to base his response. President Nixon, on the other hand, 
did have an analogy from which to work, one in which both the 
parallels and the differences were clear. Nixon drew on the Pueblo 
mainly as a lesson of what not to do. His moves and speeches 
indicate that the response to the Pueblo incident convinced Nixon 
not to bluster without action. Nixon thus avoided saber rattling, 
concentrating instead on diplomacy. As Henry Gimmel of the 
Wall Street Journal noted: 
The big difference is that the previous Administration 
initially huffed and puffed up its crisis as if it intended to do 
something; it then appeared genuinely astonished at discov-
48. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (April 
17, 1969), FE/3052/ A3/l. 
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ering it dared not. This Administration's initial reactions 
have exhibited no such illusions .... The reality, as the 
Nixon team judges it, is that popular toleration of even one 
war is in remarkedly delicate condition. 49 
There was another vital difference between the two Korean 
crises. In the case of the Pueblo, the lives of the crew were still at 
stake. In the EC-121 incident, it soon became apparent that the 
lives of the crew were no longer a consideration. Rather, 
minimizing the consequences of the crisis through diplomatic 
channels was the central feature. 
It seems evident that the failure of the United States to 
retaliate militarily following the seizure of the Pueblo strength-
ened the militant policy line of the more "hawkish" group within 
the North Korean leadership. Between 1967 and 1969, many 
leaders of the (relatively) "moderate" leadership were purged. The 
militants had argued for a closer alliance with the USSR, 
combined with an independent, highly nationalistic foreign 
policy. These two goals came into some friction when the USSR 
endeavored to remain apart from the Pueblo crisis. These more 
radical leaders, however, whatever the degree of help that the 
USSR had provided, could persuasively argue that the United 
States probably would not retaliate if there were another incident. 
Mter all, the same factors that restrained the United States in 
1968 still obtained in 1969. The outcome of the second incident 
was less to the liking of North Korea, however. A dramatic 
demonstration of U.S. military capability (in the form of a 
massive naval exercise), combined with a blatant lack of support 
from the USSR, weakened the position of the militants favoring 
additional challenges to the United States. 
In fact, Moscow publicly criticized the shooting down of the 
EC-121. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgomy, visiting Pyong-
yang shortly after the plane was shot down, said that "collective 
action" was necessary to repel U.S. warships and planes. 
Diplomatic observers in Moscow read this as a reproach to North 
Korea. 
Senior diplomats believe that the single-handed challenges 
by North Korea to the United States have caused profound 
doubts among Soviet leaders. While loyally supporting its 
ally in public, Moscow has also given signals that it does not 
49. Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1969. 
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want the incidents to lead to a confrontation with the United 
States in the Far East.50 
Pentagon analysts said they believe that the USSR had 
probably warned the North Koreans against a repetition of the 
Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. These analysts also thought that 
the USSR would not support North Korea in future incidents. 
While no one wished to force a test of this hypothesis, it did 
encourage detente between the United States and the USSR 
because Washington now had somewhat more cause to trust the 
peaceful intentions of Soviet leaders.51 
A. The U.S. Response 
President Nixon's initial reaction to the shooting down of the 
EC-121 was to seek military options. Several sources suggest that 
he quickly started the machinery of government moving toward 
development and execution of such a response. Two North Korean 
targets were selected and a speech had been prepared to explain 
the retaliation to the public. The President believed that a "quick, 
clean" retaliatory blow might signal both Hanoi and Pyongyang 
that they were dealing now with a "tougher" administration in 
Washington, a signal that was particularly desirable because of 
the administration's plans to withdraw troops slowly from 
Vietnam. 52 
Before retaliation, however, military force had to be available. 
In response to this need, Task Force 71 was assembled. With 256 
war planes, it was able to muster more firepower than the U.S. 
Mediterranean Sixth Fleet. Task Force 71 included four carriers 
(Enterprise, Ticonderoga, Ranger and Hornet), three cruisers 
(Chicago, Oklahoma City and St. Paul) and fifteen destroyers.53 
' 50. New York Times, May 15, 1969. 
51. Ibid., April 24, 1969. 
52. New York Times, May 6, 1969; Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Little, 
Brown and Company, 1974), p. 94. This source says that both President Nixon and 
National Security Adviser Kissinger initially agreed with the military recommen-
dation. President Nixon requested that Kissinger ask for the suggestion of each 
member of the National Security Council. The Kalbs believe that Secretary of State 
William Rogers' position - a cautious, non-military retaliation - was shared by 
most of the advisers, and eventually accepted by Nixon and Kissinger. 
53. New York Times, April 24, April 26, 1969. Task Force 71 was originally 
intended to include twenty-three warships; General Wheeler's April 25th testimony 
gave the figure as twenty-nine. Pentagon information sources placed the goal at 
forty vessels, to include at least three attack aircraft carriers, one antisubmarine 
carrier, three cruisers, twenty-two destroyers and at least five submarines. The 
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On April 16, U.S. forces in and near Korea were placed on 
alert and readied for the contingency of any further incidents. At 
the same time, however, U.S. reconnaissance air activity was 
suspended until North Korea's military intentions could be 
clarified. The official U.S. negotiator at Panmunjom demanded 
neither an apology nor reparations. The United States did, 
however, ask North Korea to "take appropriate measures to 
prevent similar incidents in the future," and urged it to 
"acknowledge the true facts of the case."54 
A fate similar to that of Task Force 77, formed during the 
Pueblo crisis, now befell Task Force 71. By the time it had been 
formed and entered the Sea of Japan on April21, the original plan 
for retaliation against North Korea had been reversed. As it had 
in 1968, Washington decided to risk neither a military struggle 
with North Korea nor the developing detente with the USSR. The 
rapid appearance of the fleet off the Korean coast did, however, 
vividly demonstrate U.S. military capabilities. Thus, it would 
appear that both task forces minimized the risk of weakness to 
North Korea which saw that it could initiate crises and even kill 
Americans without retaliation. 
Following this decision, the deployment was soon drawn 
down. The Pentagon had attempted to minimize the additional 
cost that such a large task force would incur by explaining that 
many of the same vessels had operated off Vietnam and, 
therefore, that the cost to move and operate them off of Korea was 
about the same. Within a week of its dispatch, Task Force 71 was 
reportedly reduced to the Enterprise and seven destroyers. Senator 
Henry Jackson later stated that the withdrawal of the task force 
was caused by "cost effectiveness since [i]t doesn't make much 
sense over a long term to require a whole fleet . . . to support air 
reconnaissance.''55 
B. Why Restraint? 
Arguing against a military reprisal was the time needed to 
mobilize the necessary force. President Nixon also was concerned 
that the U.S. public might view a military retaliation for the EC-
121 as hauntingly parallel to the air strikes that followed the 1964 
Gulf of Tonkin incident and led to the large-scale involvement in 
actual deployed task force- consisted of four carriers, three cruisers and fourteen 
destroyers. 
54. New York Times, April 18. 1969. 
55. Ibid., April 28, 1969. 
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the Vietnam war. This same factor had argued against a military 
retaliation during the Pueblo crisis. 
The major military options presented to the President were: (1) 
a limited air strike on the North Korean bases that had sent up 
the planes responsible for shooting down the EC-121; (2) a 
blockade of the North Korean coast; (3) an air strike on all North 
Korean air bases; and (4) an attempt to lure a North Korean ship 
or plane outside of its territorial waters and then destroy it. 56 Each 
of these possibilities ran the hazard of provoking a secondary 
reaction from North Korea, China, the USSR or a combination of 
these adversaries. This was considered less of a risk, however, 
after Moscow and Peking failed to demonstrate active military 
support for North Korea during the Pueblo crisis. The USSR, for 
example, could have sent additional military assistance in a 
noticeable manner to signal its active support for North Korea. It 
did not send such signals. 
The President's military advisors, while in favor of some form 
of a tough response, were well aware of the attendant risks which 
could result in another war. The President's civilian advisors also 
cautioned a restrained reaction. Defense Secretary Melvin R. 
Laird, for example, was described as "not enthusiastic" about air 
strikes. Secretary of State William P. Rogers who had argued for a 
course short of retaliation met half a day after the attack for a 
fifteen-minute talk with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. 
The State Department said that the meeting was "not in any way 
a protest," but rather an appeal for assistance. Secretary Rogers, 
in a careful speech (similar to the Johnson Administration 
statements of a year earlier which were meant to signal cautious 
intent to various audiences) before the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors on April16, declared, "The weak can be rash; 
the powerful must be more restrained. Complexity in affairs 
should teach us the need to act responsibly, to constitute 
cooperation for coercion and to move from confrontation to 
negotiation on the issues that divide nations."57 This statement 
was an indication of Washington's recognition that apart from a 
military strike, which ran the risk of a larger war, there was little 
it could do to influence or punish North Korea directly. 
The administration was impressed by the strongly favorable 
response that followed the delay in retaliation, and each 
56. Ibid., April 17, 1969. 
57. Ibid. 
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statement urging restraint reinforced the view the President had 
reached after careful deliberation (the reverse of his initial 
visceral reaction) that the moderate stance was the correct one. 
Senator Everett M. Dirksen, a Republician who had been even 
more critical of President Johnson's handling of the Pueblo than 
had been Mr. Nixon, commented on possible reaction to the EC-
121. "I don't like to see the blood lust come so quickly." Senator 
Gale McGee of Wyoming, a Democratic conservative on foreign 
policy said, "In our world today, with electronic spying, there are 
bound to be such cases. It is essential in this case, as in the Pueblo 
case, that we don't lose our cool and set in motion irretrievable 
action which could heighten the crisis." (It is noteworthy that 
both Dirksen and McGee were "hawks" in the context of the 
Vietnam war). Perhaps the major exception to the general call for 
caution was Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Democratic chair-
man of the House Armed Services Committee, who said, "There 
can be only one answer for America: retaliation - retaliation -
retaliation."58 
The balance of public opinion favored restraint, however. On 
April 18, a New York Times editorial summarized this popular 
support for a policy of military caution: 
When President Nixon speaks out for the first time at a news 
conference today on North Korea's shooting down of an 
American intelligence plane, he will be under no serious 
public pressures to alter his policy of prudent restraint. Most 
Americans appear convinced that ill-considered military 
reprisal will merely make a tragic situation much worse .... 
What the nation does expect of Mr. Nixon - and will 
incessantly demand - is immediate presidential action to 
fulfill his campaign promise that: "What happened to the 
Pueblo should and will be avoided in the future." 59 
At his nationally televised press conference of the 18th, President 
Nixon stated: 
I have today ordered that these flights be continued. They 
will be protected. This is not a threat. It is simply a matter of 
fact . . . Looking to the future, as far as what we do will 
depend upon the circumstances. It will depend upon what is 
done as far as North Korea is concerned, its reaction to the 
58. Ibid., April 16, 1969. 
59. Ibid., April 19, 1969. 
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protest and also any other developments that occur as we 
continue these flights.60 
Although it did not directly say so, this statement reflected 
Washington's changed perception of the USSR's role in Korea's 
crises. Mter Secretary of State Rogers met with Soviet Ambassa-
dor Dobrynin at noon on the 15th, the USSR had offered naval 
assistance in searching for possible EC-121 survivors. At his press 
conference, the President described the U.S. military action as 
"restrained" because of the possibility that "other parties might 
be involved." This apparently was a reference to the defense 
treaties North Korea shared with China and the USSR, a factor 
that had also constrained President .Johnson's employment of 
force in the Pueblo crisis. 
There appeared to be little parallel between Washington's 
implicit suspicion that the USSR had been somehow involved in 
the Pueblo incident and any Soviet role in the EC-121 situation. In 
a dramatic departure from the reticent stance of the USSR during 
the Pueblo incident, two Soviet destroyers on April 17th quickly 
began to help in the search for the wreckage of the EC-121, at the 
same time as U.S. planes and ships. One Soviet destroyer 
retrieved a wheel and ladder from the EC-121 and laid them out on 
the deck. The debris was described by radio to a low-flying U.S. 
Hercules C-130, and the plane was invited to photograph the 
remnants of the EC-121. At the conclusion of this vivid 
demonstration of cooperation, the Soviet vessel radioed to the 
departing U.S. plane. "Soviet Destroyer, Red Banner Pacific Fleet, 
sends condolences in connection with the loss of your aircraft."61 
At his press conference of April 18, President Nixon 
emphasized the nature of this cooperation and removed any 
thought that he blamed the USSR for the EC-121. Again, this was 
in marked contrast to the early suspicion that the USSR was 
involved in the Pueblo crisis. 
The President described the Soviet role in the plane incident 
as first 
one of being of assistance to the United States in recovering 
the debris and looking for survivors.· And we are most 
grateful to the Soviet Union for helping us in this report. Our 
intelligence - and of course no one can be sure here -
indicates that the Soviet Union was not aware that this 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid., April 20, 1969. 
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attack was to be made. North Korea is not a nation that is 
predictable in terms of its actions. It is perhaps more than 
any other nation in the Communist bloc completely out of 
control of either the Soviet Union, or for that matter, 
Communist China .... It was completely a surprise attack 
in every sense of the word and, therefore, did not give us the 
opportunity for protective actions that I would have taken 
had it been threatened. 62 
This spoke simultaneously to various audiences. With the 
recognition that the USSR had not been the antagonist and the 
suggestion that perhaps it had been saddled with an i1·:rational 
Korean ally, a signal had been dispatched suggesting that 
cooperation in analogous situations in the future would 1::e 
welcome. North Korea was warned not to attempt to repeat its 
action because U.S. military power, represented by Task Force 71, 
would be prepared for a quick response. However, considering that 
North Korea had now successfully challenged the United States 
twice within fifteen months, this was a rather weak threat. A 
subdued, brief phrase told China that it was understood that 
Peking had not engineered the crisis. And finally, a message of 
reassurance was sent to domestic audiences that U.S. military 
forces would be protected in the future. 
On April 22, the New China News Agency (NCNA) quoted a 
senior U.S. Defense Department official. "Russian willingness to 
render assistance has been astonishing. From the way they are 
doing things at present, they look like allies instead of opponents 
in the cold war."63 NCNA then condemned the "servile com-
pliance" of the USSR. It should be noted, however, that in 1969 
China was emerging from the cultural revolution which had 
intensified Chinese doubts about both Soviet and U.S. aggressive 
intentions. The Ussuri River crisis of March 1969 over the Soviet-
Chinese border had also amplified China's fear of the USSR. An 
opportunity to encourage some change in Peking's foreign policy 
perceptions seemed more possible now than it had. Consequently, 
the President's recognition that neither China nor the USSR had 
investigated the incident provided a basis for further contacts 
with both countries. 
62. Ibid., April 19, 1976. 
63. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (April 
23, 1969), FE/3055/ A2/1. 
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The Nixon administration continued to balance adroitly the 
demonstration of its military capabilities with an improvement in 
several bilateral relationships. On April 17, Japanese Foreign 
Minister Kiichi Aichi had urged the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo not to 
embark on a retaliatory action. On April 17, Japanese Premier 
Eisaku Sato commended the United States for responding to the 
EC-121 incident in a "cool, quiet and serious way".64 On April 21, 
Washington officially notified the Japanese government that it 
would not use Japanese bases to protect U.S. reconnaissance 
planes. Tokyo then asked to have Task Force 71 moved from the 
Sea of Japan. Japan worried that it might be drawn into the 
hostilities if a crisis such as the EC-121 should occur in that area 
at some time in the future. 
With a similar concern of becoming involved in a Korean-U.S. 
conflict, the USSR publicly requested on April 20 the removal of 
the naval fleet from an area south of its major port city of 
Vladivostok. The U.S. response was to explain that the reinsti-
tuted reconnaissance flights needed protection and emphasize 
that it was Korea, not the USSR, that had been responsible for the 
downing of the EC-121.65 
The now smaller fleet was then moved to the Yell ow Sea on 
April 26, and part of the protection for the reconnaissance planes 
was taken over by forces based in South Korea. However, the 
promise to South Korea of military aid of $100 million, made at 
the time of the Pueblo crisis in January 1968, had been only half 
fulfilled by late April 1969. The F-4 fighters the United States 
agreed to make available in February 1968 were now scheduled for 
delivery in August 1969. Therefore, in order both to reassure its 
South Korean ally, nervous about conflict with North Korea and 
to provide security for its own reconnaissance flights, Washington 
was prompted to move rapidly on the year-old arms agreements. 
Twenty U.S. Air Force F-4 jets were added at this time to the 128 
U.S. planes already in South Korea. Two more F-4 squadrons were 
also scheduled to replace the Air National Guard F-100 squadrons 
that had been mobilized after the Pueblo. These had been 
promised in 1968; the second Korean crisis assured their delivery. 
A New York Times editorial provided a strong endorsement of 
the administration's overall policies toward the EC-121 crisis 
while also questioning the degree of force used. 
64. Facts on File, April 17-23, 1969, p. 235. 
65. New York Times, April 27, 1969. 
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The withdrawal of Task Force 71 from the Sea of Japan and 
the deployment of a much smaller force southwest of Korea 
reflects prudent second thoughts in Washington .... [T]he 
original fleet of 29 vessels was far out of proportion to the 
requirements of its mission of protecting United States 
reconnaissance planes. Although this "surge" operation 
perhaps served a useful purpose in demonstrating how much 
American power used to be put into the area, on short notice, 
the long-term presence of such a formidable fleet would have 
been far too expensive and would have risked provoking the 
kind of confrontation it was designed to discourage . 
. . . It should be possible to provide adequate cover for 
essential reconnaissance missions less provocatively and 
more cheaply, using land-based planes from augmented 
squadrons in South Vietnam. The North Koreans, after all, 
were brazen, but not necessarily brash in attacking an 
unarmed, unprotected American plane off their coast two 
weeks ago. They had good reason, especially after the Pueblo 
affair, to believe that the United States would be cau-
tious .... 
If American forces should violate North Korean territory, 
the Koreans might very well react in a way that would 
precipitate a wider war. President Nixon's withdrawal of 
Task Force 71 indicated that he is keenly aware of this 
danger.66 
IV. RESULTS OF THE TWO KOREAN CRISES 
The 1968 Pueblo and 1969 EC-121 crises may be viewed as 
separate acts in the same drama. In each, North Korea sought to 
demonstrate its ability to challenge U.S. military credibility apart 
from Soviet direction. It assumed that the achievement of this 
goal could be more easily attained because the United States had 
committed much of its military, economic and public support to 
the Vietnam war. Particularly in 1968, Pyongyang expected that 
it could rely on the USSR for firm support. As a corollary of 
establishing its own autonomous, intensely nationalistic identity, 
North Korea sought to indicate to South Korea that it could not 
depend on the United States for continued military assistance. 
North Korea had mixed success with these ambitions in 1968. The 
United States did not go to war over the seizure of the Pueblo. It 
66. Ibid., May 1, 1969. 
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did, however, give to South Korea large-scale military aid and 
assurances of its support against threats from the North. Rather 
than undermining the alliance between the United States and 
South Korea, the two crises provoked by North Korea seemed to 
inject further life into the coalition. 
At the same time, the USSR failed to use even symbolic 
military levers on North Korea's behalf. Nonetheless, North Korea 
had encountered only a demonstration of force by the United 
States. North Korea had affirmed an independent policy and the 
United States had not responded violently. This gain had been 
offset, however, by North Korea's appreciation of an increasing 
lack of military support from China and the USSR. 
These impressions were reinforced during the 1969 crisis. U.S.-
Soviet cooperation developed into a dramatic, concrete reality. The 
United States, for example, did not propose a formal debate in the 
United Nations which might have embarrassed the USSR by 
forcing it to defend the shooting down of the EC-121. Meanwhile, 
the USSR criticized North Korea for its lack of "collective action". 
Moreover, negotiations and political agreements between the 
United States and the USSR continued to progress. These 
developments gave North Korea cause to worry about the 
reliability of its Soviet ally. 
Both Washington and Moscow appeared satisfied that the 
ambiguity suggested by the mobilization and movement of armed 
force inhibited a confrontation into which each could conceivably 
have been drawn. An example of the unfulfilled possibilities of 
Washington's responses was given by President Nixon at his 
press conference on April 18, 1969. "I do not want to leave the 
impression that the announcement of the renewal of, and the 
continuation of, reconnaissance flights is the final action that can 
or will be taken here. Our action in this matter will be determined 
by what happens in the future." 67 
The demonstration of the potential use of military force in the 
1968 and 1969 crises allowed two advantages. First, if it had any 
such thoughts previous to the incidents (which seems unlikely), 
North Korea was deterred from expanding them. Second, the 
incidents provided a "learning experience" for the USSR and the 
United States of how they could control the consequences of 
incidents neither of them wanted. This message was particularly 
noteworthy in view of concurrent events in Europe. 
67. Ibid., April 19, 1969. 
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It was a curious coincidence that the EC-121 crisis took place 
at the same moment that Alexander Dubcek was ousted from the 
leadership of Czechoslovakia under Soviet pressure. The United 
States had announced that it would not stand aside for another 
armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. 6B It would appear that, to 
some extent, the EC-121 provided an opportunity for both states to 
reassure the other that they could cooperate. 
A major negative consequence of not using military force in 
the Pueblo crisis was that it did provide an example that would 
not inhibit the Communist states in Southeast Asia from future 
uses of force. It may even have encouraged North Korea to take 
another strong step. The lack of retaliation in 1968 apparently 
encouraged North Korea to try again in 1969. The absence of 
violence in 1969, however, had quite the opposite effect. The 
incidence of subversion and violence across the demilitarized zone 
initiated by North Korea fell from 761 in 1968 to 134 in 1969.69 
Violence in Korea further diminished in the 1970s. It is not clear 
why these incidents diminished, but one suspects that Soviet 
behavior was crucial. 
V. THE MAYAGUEZ 
On April 17, 1975, all remaining U.S. personnel had left 
Phnom Penh just in advance of the victorious Cambodian 
revolutionaries; the same pattern was repeated in Saigon on April 
30. Because of these two spectacular U.S. foreign policy defeats, 
U.S. decisionmakers came to fear that trust in its commitments to 
its allies had weakened. The USSR, China and revolutionary 
movements of smaller countries envisaged a total U.S. withdrawal 
from Asia, while the confidence of the American public in its 
nation's foreign policy goals faltered. 
The U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez was seized on May 12 by 
Cambodian gunboats while in a well-traveled shipping lane in the 
Gulf of Siam on a voyage from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand. 
It had a crew of thirty-nine, and it carried a cargo of both military 
and commercial goods. Of the 184 containers the Mayaguez 
carried, 107 contained nonmilitary material and 77 held such 
"military" items as clothing, furniture and small arms destined 
for U.S. installations in Thailand. Almost immediately after the 
68. "The Nixon Administration has warned the Soviet Union that any violent 
repression by Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia will once again interrupt progress 
toward strategic arms limitation talks, diplomatic sources said today." Ibid. 
69. Clough, East Asia and U. S. Security, pp. 163-64. 
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incident, President Gerald Ford announced that he "considered 
the seizure an act of piracy," and added that a failure to release 
the ship "would have the most serious consequences."70 These 
phrases contained two familiar echoes: The emotional word 
"piracy" had been the term used by Washington to describe the 
seizure of the Pueblo and it recalled the value of ambiguous 
threats employed by Presidents Johnson and Nixon during the 
two Korean crises. But this time the threat was not to be idle. 
Mter the loss of Saigon, President Ford was quoted as saying, "I 
have to show some strength in order to help us ... with our 
credibility in the world."71 The day after the incident, "high 
ranking sources" told the New York Times that "the seizure of the 
vessel might provide the test of determination in Southeast Asia 
... the United States had been seeking since the collapse of allied 
governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia."72 These brief 
quotations do not "prove" a cause and effect relationship between 
a worry about the loss of U.S. reliability and the nature of the 
response in the Mayaguez incident, but they certainly provide 
strong reason to suspect such a relationship. Moreover, regardless 
of its genesis it was anticipated that the firm response to this 
crisis would warn adversaries and reassure allies and U.S. 
citizens as to the stability of U.S. commitments. 
Placing the capture in a historical perspective, since 1950, 123 
U.S. commercial vessels had been fired upon and seized by 
Ecuador. Fines were paid to gain the ships' release. The pattern 
followed in these cases was described proudly by the U.S. Counsel 
General in Ecuador in the Department of State's Newsletter of 
April 4, 1974, as having "centered on negotiations rather than 
retaliation."73 
A. The U.S. Response 
The U.S. government contacted China's liaison office in 
Washington and the Royal Cambodian Embassy in Peking 
asking for help. Prince Sihanouk and the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry returned the notes, as did the Cambodian Embassy. 
When asked about what China would do during this crisis, First 
70. New York Times, May 13, 1975. 
71. Washington Post, May 26, 1975. 
72. New York Times, May 14, 1975. 
73. U. S. Department of State, Newsletter, April 4, 1974. 
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Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, in Paris at the time on a state 
visit, responded, "There is nothing we can do."74 
This was a parallel to the Pueblo incident. In each situation, 
the United States had sought assistance from what was 
considered to be the major backer of the target state - a supporter 
which, presumably, should be able to control its "weaker" ally. In 
the Pueblo crisis, the USSR had not actively supported North 
Korea's position because of a distrust and displeasure with 
Korea's "adventure" undertaken without coordination with 
Moscow. These same elements were present in the relationships 
among China, Cambodia and the United States, and may have 
hindered the developing "understandings" between Washington 
and Peking. 
In 1968 the judgment had been to rely on Soviet and not 
Chinese intercession; in 1975 the decision of whom to ask for 
assistance was reversed. This seemed a logical choice. Phnom 
Penh Radio, in celebrating the Communist victory on May 12, 
1975, for example, declared, "The victory of the Cambodian people 
is the victory of the Chinese people. The strategic unity between 
Cambodia and China which is the base of our friendship will last 
forever." As in most such broadcasts, there was no mention of the 
USSR, and accounts by Western observers reported that the 
Soviet Embassy had been sacked by the revolutionaries. Conse-
quently, it was reasonable for Washington to seek communication 
with Phnom Penh through Peking. 
No casualties had been reported by the Mayaguez. While he 
was investigating diplomatic channels, President Ford also 
ordered surveillance of the ship. During this aerial observation, a 
P-3 Orion was hit by fire as it flew over the Mayaguez 
(considering that the Khmer Rouge had previously been the 
targets of U.S. aircraft, they now probably did not take the time to 
determine that the P-3 was only an observer plane, nor would they 
necessarily have been able to ascertain that fact). Surveillance 
established that the ship was anchored about a mile off Koh Tang 
Island, about thirty miles from the coast of Cambodia. The 
aircraft also reported seeing some of the crew being off-loaded 
onto small Cambodian boats. Efforts were made to stop these 
boats, because Washington feared that the crew might be taken to 
the mainland, where Cambodia would recreate the Pueblo 
situation, a lengthy detention with the seamen pictured in 
74. New York Times, May 16, 1975. 
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Cambodia's propaganda as "aggressors and spies". To prevent 
the transfer of the crew to the mainland, U.S. A-7 aircraft fired 
alongside and in front of, but not directly at the small boats. Still, 
three Cambodian boats were sunk and several others were 
damaged. A problem, however, was to decide which Cambodian 
vessels had Americans aboard. "Every effort was made and in one 
case the ship that got in was allowed to go in because it appeared 
there were some Caucasians on board."75 It should be noted that 
this demonstrated the constraints placed on violence, similar to 
the cautious U.S. military response to the Pueblo situation. 
The Coral Sea, an aircraft carrier then on its way to 
Australia, and several destroyers were ordered to the area. In 
addition, 1,100 Marines were airlifted into Bangkok, Thailand. 
Based on Okinawa, they were moved to Nakhon Phanom Air Base 
in Thailand in preparation for possible action. This move caused a 
very heated reaction by the Thais, who not only demanded that 
the United States not use Thai territory as a base of operations, 
but that the recently arrived Marines be withdrawn. 
Two days after the ship's seizure, the destroyer Holt entered 
the area, followed by the Coral Sea, the destroyers Baussell and 
Wilson, the guided missile frigate Gridley and the supply ship 
Vega. The aircraft carrier Midway was also ordered to the general 
area. The President, still not having received word of the crew's 
release, took two steps to set in motion further military action. He 
discussed the situation with the National Security Council for the 
fourth time in just over two days, and he met with bipartisan 
leaders of both parties in Congress to tell them of his plans. 
At 7:15 P.M., Phnom Penh sent its first message agreeing to 
release the ship, stating that the Cambodian government "will 
order the ship to withdraw from Cambodian water." The message 
was sent over Phnom Penh Radio, but in the Khmer language, 
which in Washington apparently raised some question as to 
whether it represented a definitive governmental position. This 
message was monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, translated, and then relayed to Washington. The 
translation was delivered by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger 
to the President at 8:15 P.M.76 It was later learned that the crew 
75. "Seizure of the Mayaguez," Hearings Before the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations and Its Subcommittee on International Political and Military 
Affairs (GPO, 1975), p. 9. 
76. Ibid., p. 37. These are Washington D. C. times given in the Congressional 
testimony. 
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had been freed by the Cambodians before the attacks on Koh 
Tang Island, placed on a previously captured Thai boat, and told 
to return to the Mayaguez. Cambodian Deputy Premier Ieng Sary 
declared in September that Cambodia had decided to release the 
Mayaguez and crew after calling local commanders to Phnom 
Penh, but did not broadcast the decision until the following 
morning. Later that morning, the United States bombed Ream 
and Sihanoukville.77 If this is an accurate recounting, the 
bloodshed that followed was not necessary to secure the Maya-
guez's release. The release of the crew occurred about 8:00P.M. on 
May 14. 
A helicopter assault by approximately 200 Marines was begun 
on Koh Tang Island. Three of the helicopters involved were shot 
down, one on the beach, one just off shore and the last, involving 
the loss of thirteen lives, several miles out to sea. The Marines 
encountered much stiffer resistance than they had expected and 
were unable to make the sweep of the island they had originally 
planned. Although there were only an estimated 150 Cambodians 
on the island, they were armed with 75 mm. recoilless rifles, 
Claymore mines and rockets, in addition to small arms. The 
Marines received heavy air support, with anywhere between 
twelve and twenty U.S. planes over Koh Tang at any given time 
during the incident. In fact, 4 79 sorties by both helicopter and 
fixed wing aircraft were flown during the crisis, of which 300 were 
of a tactical nature, as opposed to surveillance or rescue. At 9:00 
P.M., Marines from aboard the destroyer Holt boarded the 
Mayaguez with no resistance and searched the ship. They found 
no one. The official U.S. answer to the Cambodian offer to free the 
ship was that the United States would stop military action when 
the crew was free, since the ship had already been recaptured. 
While the Marines were occupying both the Mayaguez and 
Koh Tang Island, the crew members were on their way toward the 
destroyer Wilson which reported spotting them about 10:45 P.M. 
Thirty crew members were on board by 10:53 P.M. As was later 
discovered, the crew had been held on Rong Sam Lem Island, 
about twenty nautical miles from Koh Tang. In short, U.S. 
intelligence had not been strong, it had not been aware of the 
precise movements of the crew between the ship, Koh Tang, the 
mainland, and Rong Sam Lem Island, nor of the size of the force 
on Koh Tang Island. 
77. Neu· York Times, September 9, 1975. 
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It was not until 11:45 P.M. that Schlesinger reported the 
retrieval of the crew to the President. The aircraft from the Coral 
Sea had already begun taking off to carry out strikes on the 
mainland, although they did not begin to attack until about 11:00 
P.M. In short, the attacks began after the crew was safely 
returned. The aircraft attacked in three waves, the first not 
dropping any ordnance, but "buzzing" Sihanoukville, the second 
attacking Ream airbase, destroying seventeen planes on the 
ground, damaging a hanger and making craters in the runway. 
The third wave attacked a petroleum, oil and lubricant installa-
tion near Sihanoukville at 11:50 P.M., thirty-four minutes after the 
President had called for a cessation of operations. These raids 
were later justified as necessary to prevent reinforcement of Koh 
Tang and to deter the Cambodians from launching air strikes 
against the Marines on the island, in addition to proving that the 
United States was serious in its demands. Another important 
justification for the raids was the support and pride now being 
revived among the American people after the dual losses in the 
same area earlier in the year. 
With the crew rescued, all that remained was to extricate the 
Marines from the island and go home. It was not until just after 
7:00A.M. the next morning that the Marines began to leave Koh 
Tang, and by 9:20A.M. they were clear of the island and on board 
the Coral Sea. The entire incident, from the time the ship was 
seized until the Marines left, took only seventy-eight hours. The 
total number of American deaths was forty-one.7B The Cambodi-
ans lost a total of eight boats, seventeen aircraft, the air field and 
the installation (the casualties from bombings and straffing are 
unknown). 
B. Domestic Pressures 
The 1975 Appropriations Act for the Department of Defense 
contained a provision prohibiting the use of U.S. military forces in 
Indochina. It provided that "[n]one of the funds herein appro-
priated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or 
indirectly combat activities by U.S. military forces in or over or 
from the shores of North Viet Nam, Laos, or Cambodia." 
This would appear to be an explicit denial of the use of 
military force. But before the U.S. evacuation of Saigon in April 
1975, State Department legal advisors reportedly told the White 
78. "Seizure of the Mayaguez," pp. 127, 129 and 131. 
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House that such provisions did not specifically prevent the 
inherent right to protect American lives. They cited such 
precedents as the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 and the 
Dominican Republic in 1965.79 
Because American lives were thought to be threatened, the 
President was able to respond under the War Powers Resolution of 
1973. This act directs the President to "consult" with Congress "in 
every possible instance - before committing armed forces to 
hostilities or to situations where hostilities may be imminent." He 
must then report to the Congress in writing forty hours before 
initiating the action. Consultation is not "synonymous with 
merely being informed." Rather, 
consultation in this provision means that a decision is 
pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are 
being asked by the President for their advice . . . and . . . 
their approval of action contemplated. For consultation to be 
meaningful, the President himself must participate, and all 
information relevant to the situation must be made availa-
ble. tlO 
It later became a question whether or not the President had 
"consulted" with Congress about his Mayaguez decisions. 
Regardless, during the week of the crisis, the sense of Congress 
supported the ship's retrieval and the crew's release, even if the 
use of force was necessary. "Members of Congress generally 
expressed approval of the President's action and the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee adopted a strong resolution of 
support this evening acknowledging the President's constitutional 
right to order military operations."81 
Conservative members were the most outspoken in favor of 
violent retaliation. Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented, "We should 
retrieve the vessel any way we can." Senator James B. Allen: "I 
don't favor precipitate action, but it's a question of national honor 
... and if force is necessary, then force should be used." Senator 
John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
79. New York Times, May 14, 1975. 
80. "War Powers: A Test of Compliance," Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International 
Relations, 94 Cong. 1 sess. (May 7, and June 4, 1975); "Legislative History of the 
Consultation Provision of the War Powers Resolution," pp. 46-47. 
81. New York Times, May 15, 1975. 
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said, "The attack and seizure cannot be tolerated .... We must be 
as firm and as severe as necessary to protect Americans on board 
and to assure their safe return as well as the recovery of the ship 
... as well as the honor of our country." Senator James Buckley 
suggested that "failure by the United States to react swiftly and 
clinically will only invite further outrages against personnel and 
property of U.S. citizens. I therefore urge the President to order 
immediate punitive air and naval attacks on appropriate targets 
in Cambodia."s2 
On May 12, Senator Jacob Javits counseled patience with 
Cambodia, suggesting that it "may not realize what is involved in 
their reaction." There were several congressional protests, 
moreover, advanced by "moderates," that the President had not 
fulfilled the directives of the War Powers Resolution. Senator 
Hubert Humphrey, a sponsor of the 1973 Act, on May 14 (while 
military action was in progress), endorsed the use of force "if 
necessary," but added that "we want consultation," not merely to 
be informed after an act is taken. Senator Mike Mansfield stated 
on the same day, "I was not briefed . . . nor was I consulted before 
the fact about what the Administration had already decided to do. 
I did not give my approval or disapproval because the decision 
had already been made in both cases."83 House Republican Leader 
Hugh Scott also said on May 14 that he had only been "advised," 
not "consulted". But support was widespread in the Congress for 
the strong measures taken by the President. 
It was apparent, therefore, that domestic pressure for some 
form of military action was greater in response to the seizure of 
the Mayaguez than to the shooting down of the EC-121. In the 
final hours of the Indochina war, even congressional doves 
seemed to feel the necessity to reassert U.S. prerogatives in an 
area of the world where only recently U.S. prestige had suffered 
such a severe setback. The call for an armed response to the 
Mayaguez was overwhelming, reflecting, perhaps, ten years of 
frustration and ultimately defeat in Southeast Asia, defeats that a 
nation unused to losing found hard to understand. Thus, the 
incentive to strike out with even so flimsy an excuse as the 
Mayaguez. 
82. Ibid., May 13, 1975. 
83. Ibid., May 16, 1975. 
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C. Related Events 
As it had in the Pueblo crisis, Washington charged that the 
Mayaguez had been seized without any warning. Only in the 
narrowest of defmitions, however, was this accurate. The 
Cambodian coast had recently seen similar incidents. On May 2, 
seven Thai fishing boats had been fired upon. The Korean 
Transportation Ministry then cautioned ships to avoid the area 
around Poulo Wai and Koh Tang islands. This warning had been 
passed on to the U.S. State Department. On May 7, a Panamanian 
freighter had been detained for one day. On May 13, another 
Panamanian vessel had been fired on and detained for two hours. 
At about this same time, the Swedish vessel Hirado was also fired 
upon, seized and held briefly. None of these cases, however, 
caused the U.S. government to issue warnings to U.S. merchant 
vessels in the area. 84 
The U.S. Defense Hydrographic Center had not issued a 
warning about the waters off Cambodia before the seizure of the 
Mayaguez because, as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
explained at a press conference on May 12, insurance companies 
had the responsibility to provide information about potential 
conflict situations on the seas or in shipping lanes. Carl 
McDowell, President of the American Institute of Marine 
Underwriters, replied that insurance firms had not received any 
information about the troubled Gulf of Siam.85 However, within 
five hours of the seizure of the Mayaguez, the Center issued the 
following: 
Special Warning: Shipping is advised until further notice to 
remain more than 35 nautical miles off the coast of 
Cambodia and more than 20 nautical miles off the coast of 
Vietnam including off-lying islands. Recent incidents have 
been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships 
within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in the 
vicinity of Poulo Wai Island.86 
84. For the Department of State's explanation of why these warnings were not 
sent, see System to Warn U. S. Mariners of Potential Political! Military Hazards: S. 
S. Mayaguez, A Case Study (Department of State, Defense, and Commerce, 
February 11, 1976), p. 11. 
85. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and 
World Order (Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 540, Fn. 132. 
86. The conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam has been long standing. For 
an example of a hattie over these same islands, see New York Times, March 2, 
19.'56. For an assessment of the oil deposits in this area, see the Far Eastern 
Economic Review (September 20, 1974). 
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Three additional factors may have helped to explain the 
seizure. First, Cambodia seemed to believe that the Mayaguez had 
a hostile intent. Cambodia's use of force against a ship sailing in 
waters that it claimed were its own territorial waters is easier to 
understand in this light. 
Second, there is the likelihood that the seizure was conceived 
and executed by local authorities. Cambodian Deputy Premier 
Ieng Sary, in a September 1975 interview, claimed that Phnom 
Penh learned of the attack "through American broadcasts, 
because the American technology is able to convey information 
much faster than our armed forces can." The seizure, Sary said, 
occurred without prior order. After the event became known, the 
commander in Sihanoukville was ordered to Phnom Penh, where 
he was told to release the Mayaguez. Moreover, Secretary of State 
Kissinger stated at his press conference on May 13 that he was 
aware that the seizure might have been "the isolated act of a local 
commander." Thus, both sides were aware of the possibility of 
local causation.s7 
Information Minister Hoa Nim stated on Phnom Penli Radio 
on May 17 that the ship had been captured only to examine the 
cargo and crew. Because there were precedents of foreign ships 
being seized, searched and released, the Cambodians looked upon 
the U.S. military action not even as a heavy-handed attempt to 
free the crew, but as an excuse to do further damage to 
Cambodian territory and possibly to destroy the new state. 
Third, the most intriguing, one month after the capture of the 
Mayaguez, Vietnam seized Poulo Wai Island from Cambodia. This 
area had been contested by the two countries since before the 
Second World War. The continental shelf from which the island 
rises is thought to be rich in oil. With this knowledge, it is also 
possible to view Cambodia's activities in the Gulf of Siam in the 
spring of 1975 as an attempt- at least in part- to demonstrate 
its own independence from Vietnamese territorial demands. ss 
87. Ieng Sary's quotation is in Newsweek, Far East edition (September 8, 
1975). Secretary Kissinger, at his May 13, 1975, Press Conference, also commented: 
"I am not inclined to believe that this was a carefully planned operation on the 
part of the Cambodian authorities." 
88. Cited in James Nathan, "The Mayaguez, Presidential War, and Congres· 
sional Senescence," Intellect (February 1976), p. 361. Also see Nathan and Oliver, 
United States Foreign Policy, pp. 527-32. A factor not clear when this paper was 
originally written has since become more evident: the already (1974-1975) fierce 
border conflicts between Cambodia and Vietnam. This historical and present 
situation may have given further rise to the active hostility and suspicion of a 
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D. Outcome 
On May 17, at the concluaion of the crisis, Kissinger declared 
that the event reminds the world that: 
There are limits beyond which the United States cannot be 
pushed .... We believed that we had to draw a line against 
illegal actions and secondly, against situations where the 
United States might be forced into a humiliating discussion 
about the ransom of innocent merchant seamen for a very 
extended period of time ... make clear that the United 
States is prepared to defend these interests, and that it can 
get public support and congressional support for these 
actions.89 
This provided an implicit reminder that an incident such as 
the Pueblo would not be allowed to recur. It communicated this 
message to the American people and to an international audience 
of friends and adversaries. It emphasized that the dramatic losses 
in Southeast Asia would not be permitted to weaken U.S. 
determination to protect its nationals and their property. 
The next day, Kissinger left for a round of conferences in 
Europe. President Ford was scheduled to visit these same allies 
shortly thereafter. These were to be the first high-level meetings 
with the European allies after the Communist victories in South 
Vietnam and Cambodia. The rapid, intense military response to 
the seizure of the Mayaguez preceded the Kissinger and Ford trips 
as a demonstration of the will and strength of the United States. 
The President, appearing on both American and British 
television on May 24, 1975, emphasized this message. The U.S. 
response to the Mayaguez crisis "should be a firm assurance that 
the United States is capable and has the willingness to act in 
emergencies, in challenges. I think this is a clear indication that 
we are not only strong, but we have the will and the capability of 
moving."90 
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger echoed the theme that the 
U.S. response in the Mayaguez event would signal continuing 
American self-confidence: 
American action must be firm when necessary and when 
important issues of principle are involved . . . in all 
U.S. vessel sailing close to Cambodia's shore after leaving Saigon. Far Eastern 
Economic Review, April 21 and June 9, 1978. 
89. Neu· York Times, May 18, 1975. 
90. Ibid., May 25, 1975. 
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likelihood the U.S. commitments to Northeast Asia, to Korea 
as well as to Japan, will be perceived as something no one 
should challenge . . . . As long as we are bound by the 
treaty, of course, it would include Taiwan.91 
These clear statements by the President and the secretaries of 
State and Defense provided evidence to allies - particularly 
those in Asia (Taiwan and South Korea) which feared a repeat of 
the U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina- that U.S. will and 
capabilities could be relied upon. 
This signal had also been sent to opponents. The administra-
tion's domestic popularity rose moderately as the general public 
felt relief that after the long "tunnel" of Vietnam, an American 
victory of sorts, had been won. The Gallup polls of June 1975, for 
example, indicated support for the Mayaguez action; 51 percent 
approved, 33 percent disapproved and 16 percent had no opinion.92 
On April 16, at the end of the crisis, Senator Barry Goldwater 
seemed to have summarized this sense of catharsis: 
This one act of Ford could be the act that elects him. You 
know I haven't always been solidly with him, and I've 
opposed him as much as I've backed him, and I've had 
serious doubts about his leadership, and they were dispelled. 
It was the kind of decision it takes a strong man to make.93 
An ironic example of the "ripple-effect" of this crisis was that 
it assisted the establishment of relations between Thailand and 
the People's Republic of China. The Thai ambassador to the 
United States, Anand Panyarachun, had been recalled to 
Bangkok as a protest against the U.S. use of the air base at 
Utapao to support the Mayaguez. He subsequently headed a 
delegation to Peking to "lay down all necessary ground work" for 
the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
At least in the short run, however, the Mayaguez itself could 
only serve as a symbol to Thailand, not as the single cause for a 
basic change in policy. Anand, for instance, was careful to 
explain: 
I don't think that the basic agreements that we have entered 
into with the United States need to be changed .... I think 
that in this country there is a very large reservoir of goodwill 
91. U. S. News and World Report (May 26, 1975). 
92. The Gallup Opinion Index, June 1975, p. 2. 
93. New York Times, April 17, 1975. 
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and friendship toward the people of the United States and 
toward the American nation. . . and these basic points will 
not be affected by a review.94 
He emphasized that the Thai diplomatic move was intended to fit 
Thailand in with the rapidly changing circumstances in the 
region. "We are not deserting one friend in order to have new 
friends. We are not deserting anybody and we are not going to 
undermine any old friendship," he declared. The current review is 
to "remove some of the fat without affecting the meat," he said, 
"and I think that if the United States looks at our review 
questions in this light it will see that this is not an anti-American 
measure nor is it an attempt either by the government or by the 
people to raise any sort of anti-American storm."95 It would 
appear that the Mayaguez incident, with its apparent gains in 
credibility for the United States and the concomitant flexibility of 
Thailand, encouraged a more flexible arrangement in East Asia. 
Washington apparently thought that Thailand could now 
open relations with China, while still maintaining confidence in 
its U.S. military alliance. It also might seem, however, that the 
intense and abundant use of military force was in the long run 
counterproductive. The massive use of power against a weak 
country may have reinforced the image of an arrogant United 
States. This, in turn, might conceivably raise doubts about the 
value of U.S. commitments. Thailand's reaction may serve as an 
example. An unnamed Thai "Foreign Ministry official" called the 
U.S. sinking of the Cambodian gun boats "an act of madness ... 
taken with no thought for the consequences to Thailand."96 
Messages of congratulations from other allies were couched in 
cautious terms. The West German Foreign Ministry noted that it 
had "a certain interest in seeing the American trend to dejection 
and discouragement in foreign affairs come to an end." The 
Japanese deputy foreign affairs minister said that the U.S. 
operation was a "joint action for the rescue of Americans from 
piracy". The public reaction in the United Kingdom was generally 
favorable, but some officials had privately expressed disquiet over 
what they considered a precipitate use of force. 97 
94. Bangkok Post, June 9, 1975. 
95. Ibid. 
96. Washington Post, May 15, 1975. 
97. Facts on File, May 17, 1975. 
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In summary, the expense, both in terms of lives lost and the 
finances necessary to mount the military forces, the weak 
intelligence (not learning where the crew was held) and the 
inordinate use of power added up to a bottom line of mixed gains 
and losses. Domestically, this use of force was popular and it was 
viewed as a partial vindication for the earlier losses in Indochina. 
In terms of the credibility of U.S. foreign policy among American 
allies, however, this intense application of military force probably 
has been appreciated externally as a spasmodic reaction born of 
failure. Consequently, trust in U.S. commitments may have been 
strained, rather than advanced. The question among allies may 
have been, "Is it necessary for one of my neighbors - or myself-
to suffer severe losses before the United States will honor its 
commitments." 
VI. EVALUATION 
In these three cases, U.S. options, particularly those involving 
the use of military force, were limited. In 1968, conventionally 
armed forces needed for an immediate response were not 
available. This physical limitation was reinforced by the fact that 
energies and attention were directed toward Vietnam. These 
physical restraints were also present during the EC-121 crisis, and 
indeed were strengthened by the desire to avoid a wider incident 
that might have affected the improving U.S. relations with China 
or the USSR. Improving relations with both states, of course, was 
a key feature of the new Nixon foreign policy. Residual domestic 
opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam also restrained the 
President's choices. 
In 1969, as the USSR readily responded to Washington's 
request for assistance in searching for the EC-121 debris, the pres-
ence of U.S. force in the area encouraged the two major countries 
to speak to each other as "military equals". Each shared the 
problem of a highly nationalistic and headstrong ally, each 
sought to assure the other of its own desire to avoid war. The pres-
ence of a U.S. fleet in the area, which was moved away from the 
coast of the USSR, apparently at Soviet request, provided a new 
step in the great powers' "learning process". In this sense, the 
U.S. Fleet - and the accompanying Soviet ships and planes -
was highly functional. 
The later Mayaguez crisis was at the other end of the 
continuum. It appears likely that the crew would have been 
released without the degree of military force that was used. This 
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dramatic use of U.S. military power seems to have been motivated 
mainly to signal audiences beyond Phnom Penh of U.S. will and 
military strength. 
The results of each of the first two crises served as lessons 
learned for the next two. A lesson from the Pueblo was not to 
allow the crew onto the mainland. Once the crew of the Pueblo 
was removed, military action was useless. President Ford was well 
aware of this. The Pueblo was also a lesson in the frustration that 
results from not being able to mobilize force quickly during a 
crisis. 
In contrast to the Pueblo and the EC-121 crises, the Mayaguez 
incident occurred at a time when Washington could call on much 
of the military establishment, if need be, without worrying about 
diverting resources from a second crisis. Presidents Johnson and 
Nixon, on the other hand, had only limited men and material 
available, and had serious concerns about beginning a new war, 
when large numbers of U.S. military personnel were still involved 
in Southeast Asia. U.S. options and tactical machines were taxed 
to the fullest as a result of the Vietnam war. 
The Pueblo and EC-121 incidents both occurred close to shore 
and close to Korean air bases. Furthermore, they occurred in an 
area very close to the USSR, China and Japan, an area fraught 
with political tension. The Mayaguez occurred in the Indochina 
area, a region where there was considerable residual U.S. military 
strength (especially in Thailand). The Vietnamese, although 
noting the U.S. "imperialism" of the act, did not become involved. 
Thus, President Ford was acting in a region in which the United 
States could use quick and effective force without the threat of 
massive retaliation. Johnson and Nixon were caught in an area 
that was politically volatile (Korea) and had the potential to 
create a major outbreak of violence. The Mayaguez concerned 
Cambodia, where a new regime was not prepared to respond 
rapidly to the U.S. retaliation. The Pueblo and EC-121 involved 
North Korea, a stable Communist regime that was technologically 
and politically capable of quick reaction to U.S. pressure. Ford's 
Cambodian adversaries were weak. Johnson's and Nixon's 
Korean adversaries were strong. In none of these three crises did 
the USSR or China give military assistance. But this "lesson" 
was evident only after the Pueblo crisis. 
The Pueblo was much closer to the coast than the Mayaguez, 
which meant that there was more time to do something about the 
Mayaguez before it reached the coast after being seized. The 
Pueblo proceeded to Wonsan at approximately 15 knots. As such, 
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with the few stops that Commander Bucher made, it could have 
taken some two hours to reach Wonsan, or longer. Had conven-
tionally armed aircraft been on "alert," it is conceivable that the 
Pueblo could have been helped. 
The Mayaguez originally seemed to be heading for Sihanouk-
ville, but stopped short of the coast at Koh Tang Island. This 
allowed the United States enough time to get aircraft into the air 
and strafe the ship to keep it stationary. Both incidents occurred 
at about the same time of day, yet the reconnaissance flights over 
the Mayaguez continued despite the darkness. It might be 
suggested that the United States responded to the Mayaguez 
incident with greater efficiency. It might be the case, however, 
that the military, or Washington, was simply more determined to 
act. 
It is noteworthy that there had been a conspicuous lack of 
protection in each of these cases. The Pueblo sailed alone, with 
neither an escort, nor readily available, conventional armed 
planes on "alert" in a nearby location. The EC-121 had been in the 
similar situation of lacking a guard. Also paralleling the reason 
for the Pueblo's lack of an escort, in the three months before the 
shooting down of the EC-121, 190 similar flights had flown in the 
same general area without a shooting incident. Therefore, it was 
felt that this EC-121 did not need protection. The Mayaguez, a 
commercial ship following a normal sea lane of transport, did not 
consider itself in need of protection. However, it was in an area 
that had witnessed contest and seizures. 
After the Pueblo crisis Washington's fear of Soviet or Chinese 
intervention in support of North Korea was lessened as neither 
offered help during the Pueblo or EC-121 crises. During the 
Mayaguez crisis, neither China nor the USSR offered military 
assistance to Cambodia. 
The U.S. military reaction to all three crises demonstrated the 
inapplicability of the concept of proportional response to aggres-
sive acts. 98 During the 1968 Korean crisis, Washington did not 
have the available conventional force needed to alter the target's 
immediate behavior. In 1969, it similarly lacked a conventional 
nearby force for instant response. The pause caused by this 
unavailability allowed time for both the Johnson and Nixon 
98. New York Times, April 17, 1969; Michael Hamm, "The Pueblo and 
Mayaguez: A Study of Flexible-Response Decision-Making," Asian Survey, (June 
1977). 
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administrations to be praised for their "restraint". Consequently, 
the longer the hesitation before military retaliation, and the more 
the U.S. government was assured by its allies and public that it 
had taken the proper course of patience, the less likely a military 
response became in both incidents. 
In the Mayaguez situation, the proportionality principle was 
discarded altogether. It would appear that force well beyond that 
which was needed was employed. Domestically, this led to an 
infusion of confidence (though perhaps only temporary). Of more 
importance in foreign policy, the failure to utilize flexible response 
had other, apparently beneficial, results. The People's Republic of 
China saw evidence that even as the U.S. armies were leaving 
Southeast Asia, U.S. military power would be available to help 
balance Soviet power in the area. At the same time, the USSR 
may have been assured that the United States could be relied 
upon to counter China's plans to dominate its southern flank. 
The smaller countries in Asia, however, may have felt 
unsettled by what could be considered the United States' hasty 
resolution of a minor situation. Would the United States turn 180 
degrees in another crisis affecting Taiwan or South Korea and 
refuse to become involved militarily? 
A partial answer may have been provided in August 1976, 
when North Korea challenged the United States with a violent 
attack on its soldiers at Panmunjom. North Korea did not suffer 
military retaliation, although force was available for this purpose. 
The United States did show force, but did not use military 
violence. President Kim Il Sung, however, in his first direct 
message to the United States since 1953, avoided the intense 
rancor usually present in North Korean propaganda. The 
retaliation by the United States for the seizure of the Mayaguez 
did not prevent the 1976 incident, but it apparently helped to 
prompt a conciliatory North Korean response soon after, such as 
proposals of private talks with the United States and division of 
the Panmunjom negotiating site, which had previously been 
proposed by the United States. 
Violence had not been used by the United States during the 
Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. It had been used abundantly in the 
Mayaguez crisis. Perhaps the 1976 Korean event suggests the 
ineffectiveness of the 1968 and 1969 responses - lack of military 
retaliation accompanied by military movements. While it is to be 
hoped that the Mayaguez reaction can be avoided in the future, it 
should be recognized that a benefit of that reaction was to bolster 
the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments to Japan, South 
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Korea and Taiwan, each of which maintains defense agreements 
with the United States and to caution potential U.S. adversaries. 
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